Abstract: This paper enhances and extends a powerful and promis ing research program, performance-based epistemology, which stands at the crossroads of many important currents in contempo rary epistemology, including the value problem, epistemic norma tivity, virtue epistemology, and the nature of knowledge. Perfor mancebased epistemology offers at least three outstanding bene fits: it explains knowledge's distinctive value, it places epistemic evaluation into a familiar and ubiquitous pattern of evaluation, and it solves the Gettier problem. But extant versions of perfor mancebased epistemology have attracted serious criticism. This paper shows how to meet the objections without sacrificing the aforementioned benefits.
A basic model of performance assessment
A raging Achilles leads the Greek charge, driving the Trojans all the way to the Scaean gate. The siege of Troy might have ended this day, but for one fateful shot. The Trojan prince Paris, perched in the tower high above the gate, places an arrow on his bow, surveys the bloody chaos below, identifies the indomitable Greek hero, takes aim and lets the shot fly. Apollo guides the arrow through the mass of bodies and trampling feet to bury deep into Achilles's ankle, just below his leg armor. Only in that very spot could Achilles receive his death blow. Blood gushing, strength failing, eyes dimming, Achilles staggers forward in one last feeble defiant gesture before toppling dead to the ground.
We might assess Paris's shot along any number of dimensions.
We might think it cowardly that he assailed Achilles from afar. Or we might think it foolish to shoot from the tower rather than help rally flagging Trojan spirits down at the gate, or unwise to shoot at the nearly invincible Achilles rather a more vulnerable Greek sol dier. But setting aside such evaluation that places Paris's shot in a broader critical context, be it moral, political or strategic, we can as sess it more narrowly as an archery shot in battle, as a martial shot qua shot.
First, we might assess whether it attained its aim, that is, hit its target, Achilles's vulnerable heel. Here it scores perfectly. In virtue of this, call it accurate.
Second, we might assess it for skillfulness, that is, whether it manifests relevant archery skill or competence. Here our myth makers omit the pertinent detail, so we may feel free to add details as we like. The son of a wealthy and powerful king, Paris no doubt received expert training. He also had a decade of experience with the bow in battle, warding off Greek invaders. So let's say his shot manifested competence. In virtue of this, call it adroit.
Third, we might assess whether it was accurate because it was competent. Here again our mythmakers are silent, so let's add some detail. Apollo had orders from Zeus to: guide the arrow into Achilles's ankle just in case, and precisely because, Paris shoots competently. Thus Paris's display of competence figures crucially in explaining why the shot is accurate. His shot is accurate because competent. In virtue of this, call it apt.
Fourth, we might assess whether the shot's outcome -i.e. the arrow's striking Achilles's heel -manifests Paris's competence. A competence is a special type of power or disposition, and we almost certainly cannot specify in general when an outcome manifests a disposition. But case by case we find it relatively easy to tell, and in this case the outcome clearly doesn't manifest Paris's competence.
It manifests Apollo's competence at guiding the arrow's flight through the tangled and shifting mass of humanity. (Should that verdict not strike you as obviously correct, we can add that as the arrow flew, a Trojan chariot unexpectedly and improbably tumbled, interposing itself between the arrow and Achilles's heel, whereupon Apollo immediately altered the arrow's flight to compensate for the unforeseen obstacle.) As one modern teller of the tale puts it, "Apollo," not Paris, "killed Achilles." 1 In virtue of this, Paris's shot fails to be adept. Had the outcome manifested his competence, the shot would have been adept.
Ernest Sosa (2007) introduced the tripleA performanceas sessment structure of accuracy, adroitness, and aptness. Accurate performances achieve their aim, adroit performances manifest com petence, and apt performances are accurate because adroit. To that I add the fourth category, adeptness.
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An adept performance is one whose accuracy manifests competence (as opposed to being accu rate merely because competent). Call an adept performance's out come an achievement.
In a narrow sense, any accurate performance succeeds, be the outcome good, bad or indifferent. The assassin succeeds if he fatally wounds the victim, though he deserves no plaudits, only condemna tion, for this deplorable outcome. The despotic cabal succeeds if its activities establish a despotism, another deplorable outcome. Label ing some performance a 'success' here means only that it is accu rate.
Similarly, labeling some performance or outcome an 'achievement' doesn't imply approval. Many achievements ought never have come to pass. (If such positive connotations unfailingly accompany 'achievement' in your idiolect, please substitute whichever works best of 'feat' or 'deed'.) Consistent with those general cautionary points about the relation between success, achievement and ap proval, some types of success or achievement might be inherently good (or bad), and recognizing them as such would imply that they merit approval (or disapproval).
The achievement account of knowledge
On one influential contemporary view, we best understand knowl edge as a cognitive achievement (Sosa 2007 , Zagzebski 2009 , Riggs 2009 , Greco 2010 . This view treats beliefformation as a cognitive performance whose aim is truth. Accurate beliefs are true. Adroit beliefs manifest cognitive competence, including discriminating perception, cogent reasoning and good memory. Apt beliefs are true because competent. Finally, your belief that Q is adept just in case your truly believing Q manifests your cognitive competence. Adept beliefs are cognitive achievements and are identified with knowl edge. Call this the achievement account of knowledge, or AA for short (pronounced {double A}).
AA promises at least three outstanding benefits. First, it helps the agent. For instance, she might engage her enemy in a game of chess to distract him, which goal is best served by playing poorly and setting herself up to be easily checkmated. The outcome is a chess-failure yet, relative to the agent's own goals, a smashing success.
explain the added value of knowledge over mere true belief, a ques tion which has been central to epistemology ever since Plato's Meno (Riggs 2002 , Kvanvig 2003 , Zagzebski 2003 , Pritchard and Turri 2011 . We value achievement over mere success, at least when the relevant outcome is unobjectionable or better. For instance, com pare a novel whose enthralling plot manifests the author's literary genius to a novel whose enthralling plot is due to a monkey ran domly striking a keyboard repeatedly. We value the former more than the latter. Or compare a dance whose visual beauty manifests the dancer's skill to a dance whose visual beauty is due to a series of fortuitous stumbles. The former is better than the latter. Likewise, compare a stretch of inquiry whose eventual true conclusion mani fests the inquirer's intellectual skill to one whose true conclusion is due to a series of lucky guesses. The former is better than the latter. HUSBAND follows the standard recipe for generating Gettier cases.
Start with a belief sufficiently justified to meet the justification re quirement for knowledge. Then add an element of bad luck that would normally prevent the justified belief from being true. Lastly add a dose of good luck that "cancels out the bad," so the belief ends up true anyhow. It has proven difficult to explain why this "double luck" prevents knowledge (Zagzebski 1994) . AA diagnoses the prob lem as follows. The outcome -in this case, Mary's true belief that her husband is home -doesn't manifest Mary's intellectual skills, so Mary doesn't know that her husband is home. This verdict fits seamlessly into a more general pattern of manifestation failure, wherein the relevant outcome fails to manifest the relevant power coming; Turri, Buckwalter and Blouw ms.; Turri, Blouw and Buckwalter, ms. or ability (Turri 2011a, Turri 2012a, Turri 2013).
I emphasize that this is not the place to argue at length that AA delivers on these benefits, a task accomplished in numerous venues by many theorists over the last decade and more. For present pur poses, I assume that AA does deliver on those benefits. I've ex plained the basic reasons for thinking that it does, so we can later appreciate how the alternative versions of performancebased epis temology, introduced over the next couple sections, can likewise de liver on those benefits, while avoiding objections that plague AA. Duncan Pritchard (2008: 445-6) Turri, Buckwalter and Blouw ms). I think this response reflects the way we ordinarily view knowledge and is, moreover, correct upon reflection, but I will grant for the sake of argument that Henry doesn't know. Second, they could argue that whereas other achieve ments can be unsafe, knowledge cannot. While not obviously im plausible -knowledge might just be special in this way -this re sponse runs the risk of appearing ad hoc. Better would be, third, to identify a class of achievements that must be safe, and contend that knowledge patterns with these. This deviates from AA, but still identifies knowledge with a type of achievement. I will now develop this third response.
The ample achievement account of knowledge
Begin with a natural extension to our theory of performanceas sessment. Performances have a quintupleA structure. Add amplitude to the four previously mentioned. A performance is ample just in case its safety (not just its accuracy) manifests the agent's compe tence. 
The attainment account of knowledge
Last section entertained the objection that cognitive achievement isn't sufficient for knowledge. This section entertains the objection that it isn't necessary for knowledge.
Start by noticing something I didn't emphasize earlier in sec tion 3. AA's proponents claim that knowledge is an achievement that proceeds from select intellectual dispositions. Sosa (2007: 29) says knowledge must be produced by a competence, which is a dis position "that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it." Greco (2002: 308) identifies knowledge as true belief mani festing "reliable cognitive abilities or powers." Linda Zagzebski We first need a term for performances whose success manifests reliable or unreliable abilities. Call such a performance adequate.
All adept performances are adequate, but not vice versa. We also as sociated 'achievement' with the outcome of adept performance. We need a term for the outcome of adequate performance. Call them attainments. All achievements are attainments, but not vice versa.
Call attainment that is not also an achievement a mere attainment. 
Knowledge and truth
Suppose you think it is possible to know false things. You think that even if Q is false, it's still possible to know Q, so long as it is approximately true. So you'll think that AA is too strong, but not for the same reason as proponents of AA. To accommodate this intu ition, we need only adjust the admissible outcomes. Call a perfor mance that fails but nearly succeeds approximate. Call an approxi mate performance's outcome an approximation. Now we can sim ply append a disjunct to one of the earlier definitions of knowledge.
You know Q just in case your believing Q is either an achievement (attainment) or an approximation. Or suppose you think that knowledge doesn't even require ap proximate truth. Rather, you think completely false beliefs can be knowledge, so long as they're reliably produced. Again, recent empirical work should inform theoretical work on this ques tion, at least to the extent that the theoretical work purports to describe knowledge ordinarily understood. See Buckwalter under review; Buckwal ter and Turri, ms. See also Hazlett 2010, Turri 2011b, and Hazlett forth coming. 10 One objection not considered here is that knowledge doesn't require belief, in which case the domain of admissible outcomes must include some other sort of representational state or cognitive proattitude. Going back to Rad ford 1966, some contemporary philosophers have questioned whether knowledge entails belief. Recent experimental work has reignited that old theoretical debate (MyersSchulz and Schwitzgebel forthcoming; Murray et weaken the admissible dispositions. Or you can even adjust both.
Conclusion
The relation of manifestation is common to all variants. Perfor mancebased epistemology is a substantive, powerful and versatile approach. The objections to AA canvassed here shouldn't convince us to abandon performancebased epistemology and its consider able benefits just yet. To do so would be to throw the proverbial baby out with the bath water. 11 al. forthcoming), suggesting that knowledge ordinarily understood does not require belief. However, further empirical work has uncovered impor tant nuances in the folk psychology of belief, and the balance of evidence seems to support the view that knowledge ordinarily understood does re quire belief in one form or another (see Rose and Schaffer forthcoming; Buckwalter, Rose and Turri, under review; Buckwalter and Turri, under re view; Rose, Buckwalter and Turri, ms) . Thus it seems that the envisioned objection to the performancebased approach can be overcome. 
